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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN INVES:T:MENT COR-
PORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE STATE TAX OOM·MISSION 
OF UTAH and IRWIN ARNO-
VITZ, R. E. HAMMOND·, H. P. 
LEATHAM and B. H. RO£INSON, 
the Members of said Commission, 
Defendarnts. 
No. 6312 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AN)D AS-
SOCI.A!T·E JUSTICES OF THE SUPRE·ME 
COURT OF THE STATE OF u~T~H: 
Come now the defendants in the a:hove-entitled 
cause and petition this Honorable Court for a rehear-
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2 
ing upon said cause of action for the reasons and upon 
the grounds hereinafter briefly set forth: 
I. 
That this Honorable Court erred in interpreting 
and applying the provisions of Chapter 13, Title 80, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. 
II. 
That this Honorable Court erred in applying and 
interpreting the provisions of Section 80-13-21, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933. 
III. 
That this Honorable Court erred in holding that 
dividends received from stock owned by the plaintiff 
corporation in other corporations were not allocable to 
the business of plaintiff corporation in the State of 
Utah. 
IV. 
That this Honorable Court erred in holding that 
gains to the plaintiff corporation derived from the sale 
of stocks owned by plaintiff were not alloca:hle to the 
business of the plaintiff corporation done in the State 
of Utah. 
• .J 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
At the outset it is to be remembered that the plain-
tiff corporation during the year in question had its sole 
and only place of business at Ogden, Utah. , (See pages 
2 and 3 of the main brief of defendants.) With that 
fact established the conclusion is irresistible that plain-
tiff, during the year in question, exercised its franchise 
to do business as a corporation nowhere other than the 
State of Utah. 
We submit that, starting with this basic fact, the 
conclusions of the majority opinion under subsections 
2 and 3 of the opinion are not sound. 
Let us test the results of those conclusions by assum-
ing factual situations other than those presented by the 
case at bar. 
I 
RECEIPT OF DIVIDENDS 
By subdivision 2 of the majority opinion, the Court 
has held that the provisions of Section 80-13-21, Re-
vised Statutes of Utah, 1933, and more specifically sub~ 
sections (1) and (3), exclude from the taxable income 
of an investment company doing business only in this 
state all so-called financial income in the form of divi-
dends, if those dividends were declared and paid to 
the ,corporation doing, business in this state by a cor-
poration not doing business in this state. 
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The result is that the only dividends received by a 
corporation doing business in this state which can be 
taxed as income under our corporation franchise tax 
would be dividends received from operating companies 
which did their sole business within the State of Utah. 
We say sole business because it would seem obvious 
that any attempt to break down a dividend paid by an 
operating company, which operated in more than one 
state, into profits from the business done in this or that 
state would be administratively impossible. This line of 
reasoning leads to the conclusion that if dividends or 
other such financial income are to be taxed as income to 
a corporation holding the stock, such dividends must be 
taxed twice; first, to the Utah company earning them 
in the form of income to that company and, second, in 
the form of income to the investment company re-
ceiving the dividends. Otherwise, they cannot be taxed 
at all. 
For example, assume that Company A, an operat-
ing company, does business in twelve states, including 
Utah. Company B, an investment company, owns stock 
of Company A. Let us further assume that Company 
B has its sole and only office and place of business in 
the State of Utah. Company A declares a dividend for 
the year in question of $144.00 per share. How much 
:)f this dividend can be taxed as income to Company B 
rnder the Court's present interpretation of ''dividends 
:l:erived from business done within this state''~ Let us 
tssume that, for the purpose of Company A's corpora-
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tion franchise tax, there is allocated to the State of 
Utah one-twelfth of its income. Is the Tax Commis-
sion arbitrarily to say that one-twelfth of the dividend 
is derived from the business done in this state and as-
sign that portion of the dividend to Company B 's taXi-
able income1 Or is Company B to be permitted to show 
that the $144.00 dividend declared during the year in 
question was all declared from A's reserves and that 
the Utah business of Company A during the time those 
reserves were built up was a losing proposition~ 
Furthermore, by the explicit terms of the corpora-
tion franchise tax act (Section 80-13-65) it is unlawful 
for the Commission or any agent of the Commission to 
divulge or make known in any manner the amount of 
income or any particular set forth or disclosed in any re-
port or return required under the act. If the Commis-
sion were to allocate the dividends of the operating 
company on the same basis as that company's own in-
come is allocated for the purpose of its tax, we would, 
we submit, be illegally divulging information and, 
therefore, could not follow that procedure. 
The result under this illustration would be that 
none of Company A's dividend. could be assigned as 
having been derived from business done in this state 
and Company B would not he taxable on the receipt of 
any part of the dividend. This, in spite of the fact that 
Company B 's sole and only exercise of its franchise was 
within the State of Utah I 
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To further illustrate the impossibility, if not illegal-
ity, of ·any method of breaking down dividends of an op-
erating company doing business in Utah and other states, 
let us assume the A Railroad Company to be the operat-
ing company doing business in twelve states, including 
Utah. The A Railroad Company owns stock in Com-
panies X, Y and Z. Company X owns and operates a 
coal mine in the State of Colorado and does business 
nowhere else. Company Y owns ~nd operates an oil well 
in the State of Wyoming and does ·business nowhere 
else. Company Z owns timber and operates a saw mill 
in the State of Oregon and does business nowhere else. 
Companies X, Y and Z pay to Company A dividends 
during the taxable year in question in the total amount 
of $100.00. Company A in turn declares a dividend 
from its corporate funds in the same amount, namely 
$100.00. Company B, the investment company, own-
ing stock of Company A, receives the $100.00 dividend. 
Remembering that Company B has its sole office in the 
State of Utah and under our assumption does business 
in no other state, how much, if any, of the $100.00 divi-
:lend received from Company A is taxable to Company 
B by the State of Utah f 
Let us change the last illustration slightly. Com-
Janies X, Y and Z each own stock in Companies L, M 
tnd N, doing business in several states, and receive 
lividends from those companies. The dividends from 
~' Y and Z to A are from corporate funds which in-
~lude dividends from L, M and N. What part of the 
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dividend received by B from A is taxable1 
Let us change our illustration again. Assume that 
Company A, the operating company, does business only 
in the State of Wyoming. Company B, the investment 
company, owning stock of Company A, does business 
only in the State of Utah. Under the Court's decision, 
none of the $100.00 dividend from Company A could be 
taxed to Company B when computing Company B 's 
franchise tax. Assuming, however, that both Company 
A and Company B do business only in the State of 
Utah, when Company A reports its income for franchise 
tax purposes, Utah will tax all of its income. Out of 
this income, already taxed once by the State of Utah, 
it declares its dividend. Under the majority opinion, 
Company B 's taxable income would include, in the full 
amount, the $100.00 dividend.. Thus we see that Utah 
either will tax twice or it cannot tax at all. 
Suppose a corporation is formed under the laws of 
Nevada. This corporation enters into the banking busi-
ness in Salt Lake City, Utah, where it owns and oper-
ates a bank. The Utah bank is its only enterprise and 
its only offices are located at that bank. A bank, of 
course, makes its profits solely on investments. Sup-
pose its investments are in stocks and bonds of cor-
porations doing business only outside the State of Utah. 
Surely the Court would not have us say that the bank's 
income is not taxable! Suppose, instead of being in-
,corporated under the the laws of Nevada, the bank is a 
Utah corporation. Under the majority opinion this 
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would make no difference and the result would be the 
same-non taxability. 
Suppose this bank loaned money to a sheepman 
for use in operating a Wyoming sheep outfit as an in-
dividual and that all negotiations on the loan, pay-
ments, renewals, etc., were done at the bank in Salt 
Lake City. Could Utah tax the interest paid to the 
hank under the majority opinion~ 
The illustrations and examples above assumed could 
be multiplied indefinitely.. Without meaning to over-
burden this Honorable Court let us assume only one 
more example. Company B, the investment company, 
doing business only in the State of Utah, holds United 
States Government securities and receives interest 
thereon. Under the majority opinion, would Utah be 
able to tax such income as being interest ''derived from 
business done within this state''~ 
Consider, also, the position of the taxpayer-cor-
poration, Company B, in our examples above. How is 
chat company to know, under the ruling of the Court, 
what part, if any, of a. dividend received by that com-
~any is to be reported for tax to the State of Utah~ 
B:ow is Company B to ascertain and compute the 
tmount of the dividend it receives which was due to 
>usiness of the paying corporation within the State of 
Jtah ~ Company B has no facilities for determining 
mch proportion, has no grounds for making a demand 
'or information from the paying corporation and no 
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means at its command to force the paying corporation to 
supply it with a breakdown to enable it to report cor-
rectly tax lia hili ty. 
Therefore, considered both from the standpoint of 
the Tax Commission as the administrator of the tax and 
from the standpoint of the taxpayer in making correct 
returns of tax liability, the opinion of the Court is im-
possible of practical application. Taxation is intensely 
practical. And where two interpretations are possible, 
one practical and the other impractical, the former 
should be adopted. Therefore, admitting only for the 
sake of this point, that the majority opinion presents a 
possible interpretation, we submit that the one which we 
shall in this brief proffer should be adopted. 
Our main purpose in assuming these situations is 
to illustrate to the Court what we believe to be the fun-
damental fallacy present in arriving at the conClusion 
under point 2 of the majority opinion. That fundamen-
tal fallacy is that when the statute in Section 80-13-21 
(1) and (3) speaks of "business done within this state", 
it is referring not to the business of the operating com-
pany which pays the dividend but to the business of 
the investment or other company holding the securities 
and receiving the dividend. The business of an invest-
ment company is not the same type of business as that 
of an operating company. In a given case the business 
of an investment company may be solely and only to 
sit quietly by, receive dividends and interest on its in-
vestments and. declare, out of that income, dividends to 
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its own stockholders. The physical evidences of its 
business may consist of nothing more than a bookkeeper 
receiving dividend checks, depositing the same to the 
company's accounts and then, upon action of the board 
of directors, mailing out the company's own dividend 
checks. If all the business of an investment company is 
done within the State of Utah, then we submit that the 
interest, rents, dividends-the financial income of that 
investment company-are derived from its business done 
within the State and hence are clearly taxable. 
That such was the intent of the legislature is dem-
onstrated by a careful study of the entire corporation 
franchise tax act. Whenever the phrase, ''business done 
within the state" or the word ":business" is used, it is 
ased as referring to the business of the particular tax-
~ayer-corporation involved; not the business of some 
)ther ,corporation from whom the instant taxpayer may 
~eceive dividends or interest on an investment. The op-
~rating company from whom the dividends are received 
s a total stranger to the situation so far as the tax 
iability of the particular corporation involved in any 
ax case is concerned. 
1The legislative intent is also demonstrated from a 
,tudy of the Report of the Tax Revision Commission 
~f the State of Utah, 19'29, and the Governor's roes-
age to the 1931 Session of the Legislature. In the Gov-
rnor 's message, see Senate Journal, Utah, 1931, pp. 
2-58, we find throughout that document numerous ref-
rences to the need for taxing the income from intangi-
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bles, both to individuals and to corporations. At page 
25 of the Senate Journal, then Governor George H. J)ern 
said, referring to changes in taxation possible by reason 
of constitutional amendments and recommending such 
changes: 
'' 2. The enactment of a more equitable in-
come tax than was formerly permissable. The 
constitution before amendment exempted mort-
gages and shares of stock in corporations whose 
property was already assessed and also allowed 
a deduction of debits and credits. Under that 
situation the Legislature could have laid an in-
come tax upon every wage earner and salaried 
person but could not have touched the investor 
who was enjoying a large income from stocks, 
bonds and mortgages. It could have taxed the 
business profits of the merchant, the manufactur-
er, the miner and the public utility, but it could 
not reach corporations which derived their in-
comes from intangible property." (It·alics ours.) 
Again at Page 29, the Governor said: 
''The alternative to a property tax on intan-
gibles must necessarily be a small personal and 
corporation income tax. A tax based upon in-
come is undoubtedly the best if not the ideal meth-
od of taxing intarngibles. It imposes no burden 
upon any person or corporation that is not earn-
ing a net income, hence it ·can never encroach upon 
a capital investment. In a time of depression 
like the present it cannot hurt a business, be-
cause if the busines~ is not making money it will 
have no tax to pay. On the other hand it seems 
obvious that a person or a corporation earning 
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a net income in times like these can afford to pay 
an income tax and will not be hurt by it.'' (Italics 
ours.) 
When, in the latter quotation, the Governor re-
ferred to a corporation tax measured by income, he was 
referring especially to income from intangibles. This 
is clearly demonstrated by the content of the message 
preceding the quotation. 
In the Tax Revision Commission Report, supra, is 
again found, with emphasis by repetition, the recom-
mendation that income from intangibles be taxed to 
corporations. See especially pp. 30-36, p. 49, p. 67. We 
respectfully recommend to the Court the reading of this 
report in its entirety for a picture of what the legis-
lature intended to reach by the corporation franchise 
tax,· for the law actually enacted, when accurately in-
terpreted, will be seen as covering the proposals of the 
Revision Commission. 
We believe that a reading of this report will also 
iemonstrate that the phrase, "business done within the 
State of Utah", must be interpreted to mean the busi-
:tess of the taxpayer-corporation involved; not that of 
wme other company or individual. 
One more question which the majority opmwn 
~aises and to which we see no logical answer under the 
)pinion-where are the interest and dividends constitut-
ng the sole income of an investment company attribu-
able for purpose of a corporation franchise tax? Ad-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
mittedly, or at least it would seem logically, an invest-
ment company exercises its franchise somewhere. Where 
the investment company involved has its sole office and, 
so far as the record goes, performs every corporate act 
within the State of Utah, we would think that the only 
place such corporation exercised its franchise was within 
the State of Utah. Yet, by the majority opinion, none of 
the income of an investment company exercising its 
franchise only in the State of Utah and receiving its div-
idends from an operating company doing business out-
side the State of Utah is taxable by the State of Utah. 
Since, under our supposition, the particular investment 
company exercises its franchise in no other state, cer-
tainly, or at least it would so seem to us, no other state 
could exact a franchise tax from that investment com-
pany. Surely this Court would not say that Ohio could. tax 
the American Investment Corporation when it does noth-
ing there? Surely the State of New York could not tax it 
under a franchise tax. It is not within the jurisdictional 
limits of those states. Yet, by inference from the opin-
ion, those are the only states which can tax. The anom-
alous conclusion is that although the investment com-
pany indisputably exercises its franchise, it cannot be 
taxed anywhere. 
These comments will apply not only to an invest-
ment company, but also to every operating company, 
which, as an incidental part of its business, makes in-
vestments in other companies. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
II 
CAPITAL GAINS FROM SALE.S 
The same fundamental fallacy which we have at-
tempted to point out as existent in the decision under 
point 2 of the majority opinion is, we believe, carried 
over, but to an even more forced degree, to the reasoning 
by which the result under point 3 is reached. There the 
majority opinion reaches the conclusion that gains to a 
corporation resulting from the sale of securities owned 
by the corporation are not taxable even though there 
is not even a scintilla of evidence that the corporation 
so much as raised a finger outside the State of Utah. 
Apparently, the Court reaches this conclusion because 
the stock was sold through a Salt Lake City brokerage 
house on the New York Stock Exchange. The Court 
must, therefore, consider that the gain resulting from 
the sale was the result of business done outside the 
, 
State of Utah. But who did the business~ If we are 
to look to the business of the taxpayer-corporation to 
determine the taxability of a gain, then we frankly fail 
to see any basis for the Court's decision. If, however, 
[n determining the taxable income of the American In-
vestment Corporation we must look to the activities of 
J. A. Hogle & Company or its New York brokerage con-
lection, then we submit this Court has laid down a to-
;ally inapplicable and unworkable rule. 
Let us assume for the moment that the majority's 
~ule is correct; namely, that we look not to the activi-
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ties of the taxpayer, but to the activities of a brokerage 
house in connection with the allocation of a gain re-
sulting from the sale of securities by the taxpayer. Un-
der that rule, if the brokerage house sells the stock to 
someone outside the state through the New York Stock 
Exchange, the resulting gain is not taxable. Assum-
ing, however, that the brokerage house sold the stock 
over its local counter to a Utah purchaser, what would 
be the result? Assume that the brokerage house sold 
the stock over its local counter to a resident of the State 
of California who was stopping only temporarily in the 
State of Utah at the time of the purchase, what would 
be the result? We submit that the basis of the tax can-
not be the activities of the brokerage house; it must be 
the activities of the taxpayer-corporation whose stock 
is sold. If those activities, if the only uses of the cor-
porate franchise in connection with the sale, are with-
in the State of Utah, we fail to see how the gain result-
ing from such a sale can be allocated or attributed, so 
far as the corporation is concerned, anywhere other 
than the State of Utah. 
Most of the cases cited in the majority opinion in 
support of its ·conclusion in this regard are income tax 
cases. Let us follow the reasoning and the conclusion 
of the majority opinion based upon income cases to its 
logical conclusion. An individual owns stock of the 
American Telephone & Telegraph Company. He sells 
that stock through J. A. Hogle & Company on the New 
York Stock Exchange. Is any gain which the individ-
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ual may derive from that sale taxable by the State of 
Utah under an income tax~ We have thought that the 
answer would certainly be in the affirmative. This opin-
ion, however, would raise a grave question. 
Suppose a corporation organized under the laws 
of the State of Utah is engaged in the primary busi-
ness of owning and operating a grocery and food mar-
ket. 'So far as its operations are concerned, it does busi-
ness nowhere other than the State of Utah. This cor-
poration owns stock as an investment in General Mo-
tors Corporation. If this corporation, solely and only 
a Utah corporation so far as its activities are concerned, 
were to realize a gain from the sale of that General 
Motors stock over the New York Stock Ex:change, this 
Court would have us say that such gain is not allocable 
to the State of Utah so far as the operating company's 
income is concerned. We submit that there is no au-
thority for such a proposition. 
Moreover, we believe that the opinion has attempted 
to assign the income resulting in the form of capital 
gains under the wrong section of the statute. It is not 
~lear exactly which section the Court felt covered the 
~ssigning of capital gains, but we submit that such in-
3ome must ,be assigned either under 80-13-21 ( 5) or 80-
l3-21 ( 6). There is no other section applicable. The 
]rst four subsections of 80-13-21 are by their very terms 
;vholly inapplicable. Subsections (2) and (4) refer only 
;o real property and tangible personalty. Subsections 
)) ,and (3) have no reference to capital gains. 
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vV e must, therefore, choose between subsections ( 5) 
and ( 6). Since the Court recognizes that the American 
Investment Corporation does business only in Utah, sub-
section (6) becomes inapplicable. Thus, by a process 
of elimination, as well as, we submit, because of the clear 
intent as expressed. in subsection ( 5), that subsection 
must govern. And by its terms, where the corporation 
''carries on no business outside this state, the whole 
of the remainder of net income", is to be allocated to 
business done in Utah. 
We also respectfully refer the Court to a reading 
of subsection (5) in conjunction with subsection (3) 
and the other subsections of 80-13-21 in arriving at the 
proper interpretation of the phrase "business done with-
in the state". It is a cardinal rule of statutory construc-
tion that all parts of the statute are to be read to-
gether. See also sections 80-13-6 (1), 80-13-12, 13 and 14. 
When s~ read, it becomes clear that the business to 
be considered is the business of the taxpayer-corpora-
tion, not that of any other person or corporation. This 
reasoning and result is also applicable in allocating 
the receipt of dividends to Utah under subsection (3). 
Before closing this brief, we feel it mandatory upon 
us to call the majority's attention to certain statements 
in the reasoning under point 1 of the opinion. We agree 
with the conclusion reached under point 1, but we feel 
that the Court may have made some unnecessary state-
ments which may in later litigation come back to plague 
the Court. 
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In the course of the reasoning under the first point, 
the majority indicates that if a corporation acts ultra 
vires and those ultra vires acts result in income to the 
corporation, the State of Utah cannot tax that income 
under its corporation franchise tax act. Apparently, the 
fundamental theory is that only income legally earned 
can be taxed. If such a theory is sound, then we submit 
AI Capone paid the Federal Government an enormous 
amount of money to which that government was not en-
titled. Suppose a individual holds a winning ticket in 
the Irish Sweepstakes. Gambling is illegal. jTherefore, 
the State of Utah could not tax that individual on his 
winnings! 
Suppose the officers of a corporation were to sell 
out all the capital assets of the corporation without the 
consent of the stockholders. And, should there be any 
argument as to their power to do so, let us assume fur-
ther that such action would be ultra vires, if not other-
wise illegal. Apparently, this Court would have us 
say that any gain realized by the corporation from such 
action would not be taxable. 
We feel that this Court does not desire to lay down 
such a rule. It is not necessary to the result reached 
under point 1. We submit that the test as to whether 
a corporation falls within a particular category, such as 
:'holding company", "non-profit organization", "chari.,. 
cable or eleemosynary corporation'', is to be determined 
)n a dual basis-either by what the corporate charter 
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permits it to do or by what it actually does. 
In this connection we refer the Court to Section 
80-13-1 (3) under which definition, for the purpose of the 
corporation franchise tax, there need not even be a for-
mal charter g-ranted to an association in order for the 
association to be liable to the tax. So long as any group 
or association of individuals does business in a corpor-
ate form or manner, the association is liable to the tax. 
Therefore, it matters not whether the acts which pro-
duce the income are ultra vires a particular, formal 
charter or are completely ultra vires in the sense of 
doing business as a corporation without any charter 
whatsoever. 
Let us test this conclusion which we proffer by one 
more example. Suppose that Company A, doing business 
completely within the law, failed to pay its corpora-
tion franchise tax for 1939. By the provisions of sec-
tion 80-13-62 its charter must be suspended. Suppose 
that Company A's charter is suspended, but during the 
subsequent years of 1940 and 1941 the corporation pro-
ceeds to do business in exactly the same manner and 
form as in previous years. Surely this Court would not 
have us say that such corporation is not liable for the 
franchise tax during the years 1940 and 1941. 
The mere fact that criminal penalties exist to 
which such corporation might be liable is no basis and 
no reason for not assessing the tax. I may injure some-
one while operating my automobile at an unlawful rate 
of speed. It has never been thought that merely he-
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cause I may be liable to criminal punishment, I am not 
also liable to civil redress. Similarly, merely because a 
group of individuals illegally operates as a corporation 
and hence subjeets itself to criminal liability is no basis 
·or reason for concluding that such operations are not 
subject to legitimate taxes which by their specific terms 
are applicable. 
III 
CONCLUSION 
We, therefore, submit that the majority opinion ·has 
misconceived and misinterpreted the applicable provi-
sions of our corporation franchise tax act. The rule laid 
down in the majority opinion will completely nullify the 
tax so far as investment eompanies are concerned, so 
far as any taxation by the State of Utah of financial 
income to any corporation is concerned and so far as 
the taxation by the State of Utah of any gains resulting 
from any corporate sales of securities. The reasoning 
in the opinion will result disastrously in its ramifications 
:tnd repercussions, not only on the corporation franchise 
tax but on many other taxes. We sincerely believe that 
~his Court should reconsider its decision and to that 
md pray that this Court grant this petition for rehear-
ng and give your defendants an opportunity to present 
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further analysis of authorities and further reasoning 
to this Honorable Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GARFIELD 0. ANDERSON 
GRANT A. BROWN, 
Attorneys for Petitioners. 
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